In a distributed system where scalability is an issue, like in a GRID [4] , the problem of enforcing mutual exclusion often arises in a soft form: the infrequent failure of the mutual exclusion predicate is tolerated, without compromising the consistent operation of the overall system. For instance this occurs when the operation subject to mutual exclusion requires massive use of a shared resource.
Introduction
In an ideal distributed system there are no centralized resources, all of them being equivalently able to play any role. However, in practical applications, it is often the case that the introduction of a centralized resource may be appropriate, in order to reduce the cost, or to improve the performance. The loss of scalability and fault tolerance, which is inherent to the introduction of a centralized resource, is accepted as a tradeoff.
For instance, consider the communication infrastructure of a network: be it geographical, or located inside a building, it will probably be based on a backbone. Although this may be replicated for fault tolerance, nonetheless it will break the symmetry of the system. A system that uses certification based on public/private yields another example, since it exhibits a centralized resource located at the certification authority site. Although public keys may be cached locally, the presence of a certification authority breaks the symmetry.
Components of a large distributed system may need to regularly perform operations that require a relevant share of such centralized resources: for instance, peripheral components may want to update local caches of data from a database, or upgrade local software by downloading new revisions from remote mirrors, or simply renew their credentials. In a system that wants to scale, the performance of such operations should not be tightly bound: occasional congestion of the centralized resource should be tolerated with a tolerable degradation the high level service running at the edge.
In order to keep congestion an occasional event, applications must be equipped with a congestion avoidance mechanism. Such mechanism should coordinate the access to the centralized resource so that congestion is avoided as long as the overall load is nominal. When requests overtake the capacity of the resource, it should reproduce at the edge the effect of a congestion, but without stress for the centralized resource.
One key requirement for a congestion avoidance mechanism is that it must not impact system operation: this excludes the adoption centralized algorithms, that are not scalable, as well as distributed algorithms based on deterministic consensus, that have an heavy footprint.
Summarizing, unlike traditional mutual exclusion, modeled by a concurrent write on a shared register, our problem statement includes the occasional occurrence of simultaneous instances of the protected operation. This is due to the nature of the controlled operation whose performance may degrade when many are executed simultaneously, but without damage for the consistency of the system. This is formally translated in the following definition:
Requirement 1 A soft mutual exclusion algorithm for the protected operational A ensures that at any time, with high probability, there is just one component enabled to perform A. The probability that more than one component is enabled falls exponentially in the number of enabled components.
We propose a simple distributed algorithm that implements soft mutual exclusion. The algorithm falls into the peer to peer family, since there is no centralized agent, and all participants run the same code. The result is the circulation of a token, ensuring that, with high probability, exactly one token is present in the system. We do not assume a fixed topology or a preliminary overlay design phase (as in [9] , aimed at multicast). The token is circulated according with a random walk concept, that can be tailored to run on any topology. We evaluate its performance in a full mash that represents the transport (not network) level of the Internet. Formal results (see [8] ) justify the claim that our algorithm may be of interest also in networks with an average degree comparable with log N , where N is the number of components in the system.
The algorithm relies on the knowledge of the membership of components that may execute the protected operation. Without impact on scalability, this can be maintained on a centralized server, which can be replicated for fault tolerance. Indeed, the algorithm we propose can be used in order to manage a membership, with an approach which is an alternative to gossiping (see [5] ).
The relationships with Dijkstra's (deterministic) self-stabilization [3] are evident: however, instead of using the knowledge of neighbor's state, we enforce mutual exclusion using time constraints computed locally. We share with some randomized self-stabilizing algorithms the basic idea of performing random moves in order to compensate lack of information. Our approach may be regarded as an evolution of [6] : with respect to that work, we introduce a probabilistic definition of closure, since the token management scheme may itself induce divergence from stable operation. Such event occurs with low probability, and is promptly compensated. As for the token elimination rule, the probability of collision is augmented by widening the collision window so that recovery is substantially improved with respect to [6] .
Although many topics discussed in this paper have been extensively treated in formal papers, here we prefer a simulation approach: this is motivated by the fact that the solution we introduce uses technical details that would make difficult a formal evaluation. Whenever appropriate, we will make reference to formal works that motivate the framework of our approach.
Establishing a reference: random access
To have a sort of reference, we introduce a straightforward solution to the problem of granting access to a shared resource: each component issues a service request periodically, without any form of coordination. The period between two given requests is based on a system wide period ∆ min perturbed by a random bias, chosen in the interval [0, ∆ min /2], which is introduced to break synchronous behaviors.
We performed a simulation lasted 10 6 time units, assuming that all instances of the protected operation take 4 time units to complete (∆ op = 4) and with ∆ min = 600, to show that such algorithm is a low end solution to the soft mutual exclusion problem: in table 1, the number of time units during which more than one protected operation is running falls exponentially with the number of simultaneous operations (first column). We performed two distinct simulations to show how the performance of such solution scales up when we step from a nominal workload (N = 150) to an overload (N = 300).
As we see, the number of concurrent operations is hardly acceptable, and the system has no way to adapt itself when the size of the membership scales up. This motivates our interest for a better algorithm, with a light footprint on system load.
System model
The system is composed of a set of N components, interconnected by a complete mesh of links: for each couple of components (c i , c j ) there is a link l i,j that connects them. This simple model is meant to represent a network level view of the Internet. A failure model is discussed in section 4. We do not assume sharply synchronized clocks, but their drift should be reasonably low: hypotheses on local timing are not critical, and will be explained at the end of section 4.
All components run the same algorithm, which basically consists in receiving a token, possibly performing the protected operation, and finally passing the token to another component. The token passing protocol is described in sect. 4, and uses UDP-like datagrams.
The time between two successive protected operations can be modeled using the cover time of a random walk in the system graph: in [8] the authors prove that the distribution of such random variable is characterized by a small probability after a value that grows with O(nlogn). Therefore, we may expect that its distribution is comparable with that obtained using the reference random access algorithm introduced in section 2.
The algorithm is based on a few time constants, which characterize the system. Although the algorithm is not overly sensible to the value of these constants (as shown by simulation), their evaluation is a critical step which should be carefully considered. They relate to the specific application, and are listed for increasing magnitude:
∆ skip the minimum latency of a token inside a component: this is the time a token will stay in a component if the protected operation is not needed. A non null value ensures that the token will not bounce too rapidly, thus dissipating network resources;
∆ op the typical duration of the protected operation;
∆ min the minimum time between two successive protected operations on the same component.
∆ max the maximum time between two successive protected operations on the same component, which is used to regenerate a new token when we suspect its loss.
We introduce a rate that binds two of them with the size N of the membership:
When such rate is greater than one, we say that the system is overloaded.
The token passing protocol
The protocol supports token passing between a token sender and a token receiver. It is composed of three successive messages: a token passing message carries the token from the sender to the receiver, an acknowledgement message is sent in reply to the previous message, and another commitment message sent by the token sender confirms the token receiver that the acknowledgement was received.
The token consists of the identifier of the host that generated it, of a Unix timestamp corresponding to the generation time, and of a random id generated by the sender. The acknowledgement and the commitment contain the same fields, but the generator field is set to a distinguished NULL value.
Both the sender and the receiver use timeouts to detect message loss, respectively of the acknowledgement and of the commitment. For convenience, they are set to ∆ skip : they should neither be much shorter than this, since this makes the timing of the token passing operation uselessly critical, nor too large, since this would make time consuming the detection of a token passing failure.
In case the token sender does not receive the acknowledgement in time, it will consider the token as lost, and will not send the commitment. The token passing operation is considered as failed, and is retried, possibly selecting another neighbor.
In case the token receiver does not receive the commitment in time, it will consider the token as lost, and it will not execute the protected operation.
Both components will silently discard late messages. The token passing protocol ensures the property that, when both partners leave the protocol, at most one holds the token. Only in case the commitment message is lost the token is lost too; otherwise either the token is passed successfully to the token receiver, or the operation detectably fails and the token sender keeps the token.
To verify that the above property holds, consider the following argument. Let a series (p1, . . . , pn) of token passing operations. Consider that the token sender fails to receive the acknowledgement in all operations: regardless whether the token receiver has or has not received the token passing message, it will not receive the commitment message, which is sent only in reply to an acknowledgement. As a consequence the token passing operation fails, the token sender will keep the token, and will be able to consistently retry the token passing operation later. Now consider, without loss of generality, that the token sender receives the acknowledgement for the n + 1-th token passing message. The token sender will consider the token passing operation as successful, and will send the commitment message to the token receiver. In case the commitment is received in time, the token is passed successfully, otherwise the token is lost.
This concludes the proof of the above statement.
In case a security hardening is required, each message is encoded by the respective sender using a private/public key pair.
Our failure model is based based on experience with current technologies: according with practice, the loss of a token passing message, first of three in a token passing operation, is a rather frequent event, being caused by a temporary unavailability of the network or of the token receiver. The effect of this adverse event on our protocol is of delaying the token passing operation by ∆ skip time units. The loss of the acknowledgement message is far less frequent: the period of unavailability of the network or of the receiver should begin during the lapse of duration ∆ skip , or be unidirectional. Also in this case the effect is of delaying the token passing. We regard the loss (or excessive delay) of the commitment message as an infrequent event, the network and the components having been excersised in both directions during the last 2 * ∆ skip lapse. Only in this case we have a relevant effect on our protocol, which consists in the loss of the token.
Therefore we approach the design of our algorithm considering that the 3-way token passing protocol avoids token duplication, and ensures that token loss is an infrequent event that must be taken into account. Its occurrence is related to a traffic anomaly (for instance, a packet discard policy due to network congestion), and not to occasional unavailability of a component or of the network.
The algorithm
The algorithm falls in the category of self-stabilizing algorithms, as defined by [3] and is probabilistic, in the sense defined in [1] . Let us first examine the stabilized behavior, that corresponds to the case where there is exactly one token in the system.
During stable operation the behavior of the algorithm is simple, consisting of receiving the token, performing the protected operation only in case the component performed the protected operation more than ∆ min time units ago, and finally passing the token to another component.
The probabilistic model that describes the occurrence of a protected operation on a edge component cannot be described analytically, since each event can last ∆ skip , or ∆ op , depending on when the previous event has occurred on that component. A simulation approach seems more appropriate to study the behavior of the system, and we will address simulation results in section 6.
The loss of a token can occur as described in section 4: such event breaks the stable behavior. The token generation rule recovers from such event, and consists in generating a new token when a component does not receive one within a timeout ∆ max from the last token. Indeed, it is far more frequent that the token is not really lost, but simply exhibits an anomalous delay: in that case, such rule may induce the simultaneous presence of multiple distinct tokens in the system. Therefore the token generation rule rule, which is introduced in order to recover from a token loss, most times has the effect of disrupting the stable property by introducing spurious tokens.
In order to remove spurious tokens, we apply to a token removal rule: the component discards a token t when it has been enabled from less than ∆ min time units by another token preceding t. Precedence is based firstly on the timestamp included in the token, and next on the generator identifier.
Such rule has the property that, in case of a wrong token loss detection, with high probability the spurious token will be removed after being passed a few times. In fact, consider that, at any time, many components have not exceeded their ∆ min timeout: if the spurious token visits any of them it will be thrown away. Since for each token passing operation the spurious token has the same probability of being removed, the probability that the token survives falls exponentially with time.
Spurious tokens are also generated in response to token loss: in such case, many components will exceed ∆ max in fast sequence, generating a new token in response. Let t gen be the time when the first new token is generated: if the token was lost more than t gen − ∆ min time units ago, we are sure that the first generated token will persist, and all other tokens will be removed. Otherwise, all components that were visited by the lost component during the lapse [t gen − ∆ min , t gen ], may wrongly remove the new token: following that, like in a sort of domino-effect, all regenerated tokens may disappear, thus reintroducing the anomalous state.
Although the problem of token elimination is well studied in theory, and is often referred as a solution to the leader election problem (see [2] ), our setting disencourages a formal approach. Indeed, tokens are continuously generated, and two token meet when they hit the same component within a certain time interval (like in a worms game). These two facts make smart theoretical results, that are based on an initial population of tokens, and on exact collision of tokens for token elimination, useless fo our purpose.
In our case, the (adverse) probability of an early token loss detection is bound to the rate between ∆ op * N and ∆ max : when this rate is small (around 0.2, according with our simulation), the probability that the regenerated token is removed is sufficiently small, and the system recovers to stable operation.
The previous statement introduces a sensitivity of the algorithm to the number of components in the system, that we discuss in the next section.
Dynamic join and leave
The dynamic variation of the membership that runs the token circulation algorithm is a key issue: although we disregard the implementation of the membership update protocol, we must consider that the number of components participating into such protocol (N in the above formulas) may vary in time.
When we analyze the effects of a variation of the size of the membership, we must take into account that the role of our protocol is that of reproducing the behavior of a congested resource, when the number of components in the system increases.
When the size of the membership N is significantly near the rate ∆max ∆op , the system shows instability when the token is lost. Until the token is not lost, the algorithm performs normally, the intervals between successive protected operation on a component increase, while the rate k load reaches and overtakes the unit. However, only when the token is lost, the system becomes unstable: this is reflected in figure 1 , that shows the number of protected operations running for each time unit during a stabilization period. It may take a long time before the system goes back to its normal behavior (approx 20000 time units), and this may be inappropriate for certain applications.
In order to cope promptly with the event of a token loss, each components must dynamically adapt the timeout ∆ gen used to regenerate the token, setting it to a value higher than ∆ max when needed. This adaptivity is obtained incrementing ∆ gen at a constant rate (50% in our simulation) each time the component needs to regenerate a new token, and decrementing of a small fraction (5% in our simulation) of the difference from ∆ max each time the component receives a token.
Such rule has no effect on a component as long as it regularly receives a token and ∆ gen = ∆ max . When a token is lost, all components that generate a new token rapidly raise their value, and the new value is used only if all tokens are lost again, which indicates that the system is inclined to instability. ∆ gen will keep growing exponentially, until the stable condition (just one token) is reestablished. When the system reenters that mode, the value of ∆ gen on all components that incremented it during the unstability will logarithmically tend to ∆ max again.
Note that, while ∆ max is a system wide constant, ∆ gen is a local variable that is updated in response to local events.
Simulation shows that such rule (which is inspired by TCP congestion avoidance [7] , but also by many self-regulating devices) is extremely effective in coping with k load larger than one, which corresponds to overload.
In figure 2 we show a programmer-friendly description of the wandering token algorithm.
Clock synchronization
As for relative drift among clocks, which alters the measurement of time intervals, we should ensure that the various timeouts are measured appropriately, Table 2 : Time constants used in the simulation, in arbitrary time units but the rules are not critical with respect to the measurement of the duration of such timeouts. A drift of 10 −4 , which is typical of a low cost crystal clock, is adequate. However, badly compensated clocks may induce inconsistent operation.
The application of some of the rules explained above requires a certain degree of synchronization among the clocks of the components. Such synchronization should simply ensure that the token t g , generated in response to a timeout for a token t x , has a timestamp larger than t x : therefore the only requirement on clock accuracy is that it should be small compared with ∆ max . In section 7 we will show that such accuracy falls in the range of the minutes.
Simulation results
We carried out a series of experiments using a simple (200 Perl lines) ad hoc discrete event simulator, which is available upon request.
The simulation takes into account token loss, token regeneration and token removal, as explained in section 5. We do not simulate variable durations of the token passing operation: instead this is assumed to be negligible with respect to ∆ skip , the minimum time the token is hold by a component.
We tested the regularity of the execution of the protected operation during a long run, as well as the number of tokens in a system characterized by the time constants in table 2. All simulations last 10 6 time units. Table 3 can be compared with table 1 , and the improvement is quite evident. When the system is not overloaded (N = 150) the number of time spent with more than one protected operation running is less than 0.5% of the total duration of the experiment, while using the random access algorithm this amounts to more than 15%. The comparison is less favorable when the system is overloaded: in that case the system controlled using the wandering token spends 10% of the time running two or more protected operations, while using the reference algorithm this amounts to 40%.
The interval between protected operations reflects the progressive saturation of the resource moving from 150 to 300 users: the distribution of such random variable is shown in table 4.
The transient following a token loss event is a critical issue: its length is relevant, as shown in table 5, and its distribution is dispersed. However, during the stabilization transient, the algorithm shows good properties.
During most of the time there is at most one protected operation running: in our experiments, this statement is violated during 3% of the time in case of nominal load (N = 150), and in 9% of the time in case of overload (N = 300), which are comparable with the same figure during stable operation. However the distribution of such random variable has a longer tail, when compared with stable operation. For instance, in case of overload (N = 300), during stable operation we observed 8 time units over 10 6 (0.0008%) where more than 5 protected operations were running (see table 3), while during stabilization this occurred during (0.015%) of the time.
The interval between successive execution of the protected operation on a component exhibits a similar behavior: during stabilization most of the values of this random variable are concentrated about ∆ min , but their dispersion is significantly higher: in case of overload, during stable operation only 9 intervals over 10 9 are longer than 3000 = 5 * ∆ min time units, which might mean starvation for the application that wants to perform the protected operation, while during stabilization this amounts to almost 15%. The application would probably assimilate this event to the temporary failure of the shared resource, and act accordingly.
Discussion
We introduce a case study that justifies the system constants used in the simulation described in section 6.
We consider a network where large amount of data must be processed by specialized processing units. The shared resource in a 10GBps network backbone. Although this is not a bottleneck during normal operation, when a user requires the processing of remote data, the application will try to exploit as much as possible the capability of the backbone. Other best effort traffic will not suffer for this, but concurrence of other similar operations would require the intervention of traffic shaping, which would degrade the performance of the network. A centralized database records the identity of the applications that want to use the backbone, after checking their credentials.
We configure our system to support nominally N = 150 data transfer applications. Applications are enabled to use the backbone for ∆ op = 4 seconds, which corresponds to a data transfer of 40GB. Each application should be enabled to use the network typically once every ∆ min = 10 minutes, in order to feed its computational activity with data, or to upload the results. This is consistent with the fact the each of the 150 unit should periodically enjoy the availability of the unit for 4 seconds: 150 * 4 = 600. So the input for our problem is the nominal number of units, and the duration of each operation.
Based on the above parameters, we can figure out the behavior of the system: as long as one token is wandering in the system and the number of units is nominal or less, 80% of the times the applications have access to the backbone within 2 * ∆ min . Occasionally (less than one percent of the time) two or more applications are allowed to use the backbone: which should be hardly noticeable, since such overlap is produced for a few seconds.
When the system grows up to two times the nominal size, the chance of concurrent execution increases, but the event that more than 3 data transfers are occurring simultaneously is rare, and should be manageable by the application and by the network with a noticeable but sporadic degradation of the performance. The period between successive data transfers is 90% of the times lower than 3 * ∆ min : this reflects the increased number of users of the shared resource, and should slow down the application of approximately 30%.
The transient after a token loss event may be quite long, taking several hours to terminate: during that time a system of nominal size performs, for the sake of simplicity, like an overloaded one. This may be admissible in our case study, since the user application will simply experience a slightly degraded level of network performance. When the system is seriously overloaded, the congestion avoidance mechanisms of the underlying network may undertake traffic shaping.
Conclusions
The wandering token algorithm is proposed as a solution for those architecture where moderating the concurrent access to a shared resource can improve the performance. Its cost, in terms of communication and computation, is negligible.
The algorithm is fully scalable: when the scale (i.e., the number of components in the system) overtakes the capacity of the shared resource, the wandering token algorithm gradually reduces the resource share granted to each component, thus shielding the shared resource from the consequences of the overload.
While token duplication is avoided by a 3-way token passing protocol, the loss of the token cannot be excluded. When such event occurs, the operation 
